



DERRIDIAN METAPHOR AND NARAYAN'S HUMANISM IN R K NARAYAN'S *THE GUIDE*: PROPOSING NEW SIGN OF FORCEFUL CERTAINTY

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ABSTRACT

No one can deny the transfer of thought-energy arising out of the dispute between Plato and Aristotle to this time: Philosophical Metaphor/Rhetorical Metaphor. The textual transmission from those times fuelled a war between poetic and philosophical metaphor. This paper looks at the ways in which a discourse in a novel and philosophical texts could generate possibilities of meaning, through metaphors and quotation marks, especially scare quotes (when used as metaphor).


The Guide by RK Narayan concludes with a certain uncertainty when the Swami who was fasting for rain, suddenly told his disciple waiting for rain, "Look Velan it's raining in the hills" (237). These lines have become one of the most ambiguous lines in the history of Indian writing in English. This paper will try to find out the metaphor of certainty/uncertainty inherent in it. It will be studied with reference to both elements of philosophical/fictional language of quotation marks, in grammar, especially through the helioscope of Jacques Derrida's "White Mythology." It will also dwell into the textual writing which makes the reader dead and the author immortal.

Keywords: *Heliotrope, Metaphor, Forceful Certainty.*

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The basic difference between a scare quote and a quotation mark and which limits its function as a sign is this, respectively: Do they convey something or do they convey something of someone? Are they being used or are they being mentioned? Do they tell or do they show? Between the thought and the text, quotation marks are conditional that is why untrustworthy 'third party' rhetorical figures. Quotation marks are used when the speaker has lost her/his power to speak for him/herself. When alphabetical language loses its power to express, these signs appear. They are used for the presence of the other in the context, other than alphabets. Basically, this other is no more less than the sun shone, a phantasmagoric sun, with the artificial reflection through the tain of the mirror as a sign in the context. On the other hand, this otherness and this phantasmagoric sun can be conditional if we use scare quotes. This otherness and conditionality, in scare quotes, gives power to the self within the text and the context. What one claims to show or tell while using these quotation marks is that "I know, with all kinds of illocutionary forces, that what the other 'said' and even what I've 'said.'" So in one way it has that spark of European phenomena of "force."

But what about this sun reflecting on the snow of the philosophical text? How does a philosophical scholar, in a philosophical text, use them? When someone writes, "Therefore I am." How to know whether it is a philosophical quote or a general statement with or without any force?

That is why it is belived that the quotation marks and scare quotes, these optical signs shining like the golden ranks of a commissioned officer, fail to show this.

UNDERSTANDING SCARE QUOTE

If I hear someone say 'it's raining' but do not know whether I have heard the beginning and end of the period, so far this sentence does not serve to tell me anything. (09)

When Wittgenstein said the above lines he never had read RKN's word, "raining," of his *TG*. All languages point out (Wittgenstein). But what turns more than a quotation mark in a language, "q-u-o-t-a-t-i-o-n" used instead of "this" and "that" as a metalingual expression? Everyone has pointed out that it is difficult to use scare quotes in spoken utterance (*Stratford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*). But they become more metalingual when one knows that there is no expression of quotation mark which can be represented in phonetic language. But how can one put a phonetic transcription into quotation mark and a quotation mark in phonetic transcription when there is no phonetic sign for a quotation mark? Using

body language for quotation marks is slightly fetish of the text.

Scare quotes set an example of mimesis (Davidson 26). That is why they are double, mirrored, inverted images of each other, and not singular. That is why they create infinity and thus a lost certainty. For Davidson, quotation marks point out (*Stratford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*). It is the feature which is shared with optical simile: "Metaphor puts before our eyes with vivacity what simile reconstructs indirectly and more clumsily" (WM 39). Scare quotes are analogical device par excellence because of their sign value, their doubling and their being the other, subaltern and also at the same time superior amongst the alphabetical order. They rise afresh every time but are not new as every time as they hold the same sign value. But this new yet old Other should be represented by the other. Still this biased approach is fit for the barter of values. It is not cumbersome to call these double signs of quotations as a double similes and further as analogy as "[analogy] is almost a simile, or a double simile" (WM 43).

Thus let us try to write like this:

A. Sandeep said that R K Narayan said, "I am a writer."

But we cannot write like this:

B. Sandeep said, "'I am a writer.'"

The human anxiety arising out of ungrammaticality: That is why to some, these double quotes, which are themselves unprotected by any other quotation marks (except in double quotation), initiate certain level of ungrammatical anxiety.

As for Ward, 'quotes' irritate and mislead (23). These irritations have led to the attention of theoreticians like Frege and his semantic and pragmatic studies as we have in his "On Sense and Reference", especially pages 57 and 58. These irritations have even led scholars to dwell into the Proper Name Theory, the Description Theory, the Demonstrative/Paratactic Theory, the Disquotational Theory, and the Use/Identity Theory (*Stratford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*).

However, this question is less pondered and taken care of: What are the signs of scare quote if not inverted synecdoche?

SCARE QUOTE IN LOGICAL STUDIES

Now if we were to regard equality as a relation between that which the names 'a' and 'b' designate, it would seem that $a = b$ could not differ from $a = a$ (i.e. provided $a = b$ is true). (Frege 56)

Besides the above mentioned quote of Frege in his "On Sense and Reference" the sign value



of scare quote can be judged as per the descriptive theorists who believe with tautological obsession "a quoted series of expressions is always a series of quoted expressions" (Geach 82).

Scare quotes, when seen from the angle maintained by Frege in his "On Sense and Reference," mingled with the descriptive theory of quotation, generates the following assertions:

- (1) a=a
- (2) "="
- (3) a=b
- (4) "' (the deconstructive

sign of uncertainty used by present scholar is a rethinking and inversion of Davidson and his "Atlanta.")

If one reads (1) while throwing a casual glance at it, one can say that it corresponds to (2) due to the value of similarity (of signs). But a second reading lets us understand that even (3) is similar to (4) firstly because of its optical value of singularity, logical value and analogical strands in spite of the fact that optically 'a' and 'b' in (3) bear different sign values. On the other hand, (3) also bears the same relation to (4) due to the mirror image of the inverted single quote on the tain of the mirror (") of (') than its inverted doubles on the mirror (") or even Davidson's (') and that is why the true sign of uncertainty in philosophical discourse.

When one looks at the optical sign value of scare quotes, it is pertinent to say that these quotes are to be projected as subject and predicate of a sentence but not without its basic feature of similarity contained in (1) as obviously in (2). The value of uncertainty projected in (4) and the problem generated due to its half will be further elucidated in the ensuing pages.

But above all, one must not forget to read the sign of "=" (which has not been explained much in grammatical studies but is taken as the Truth establishing tool) as something akin to the pragmatic 'truth' contained in a sentence. "=" becomes the sign of certain truth without scare quote itself. These certain truths are often thought of when talking about scare quotes in various theories concerning the same. As per Davidson :

It is a necessary adequacy condition on a theory of quotation that it either explains how quotations can exhibit features... or, if it fails to do so, then it must present an argument for why the unexplained feature(s) doesn't require explanation. (*Stratford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*)

These "unexplained features" keep on iterating, marking a weak distinction of "use" and

"mention" in TG and WM. The following lines are creative recreation of the forces of tension, through a reader; beyond what is told but shown in TG. In light of the latter, an interpretative and experimental glance is thrown at the last lines of TG:

Villagers: "When will it rain Swami?"

Swami: "...'

Villagers: "When will it rain Swami?"

Swami: "...

Raju: "Look Velan it is 'raining' in the hills." (Here raining in scare quote indicates the uncertainty arising out of the word rain when the author leaves to the reader to understand and comprehend the uncertain).

Velan: "You're right master. It may be raining over there."

Raju: "I can see 'it' coming on my feet."

American Doctors: "It's a case of tickling, hallucination, low BP so on and so forth."

Reader: "What after this?"

But finally, in the original text, the following marked utterance has an absent mark of scare quote of which perhaps only RKN, the author, was aware:

Raju: "Look Velan it is raining in the hills[...]"

The above mentioned explanation, without a scare quote, is nothing but the uncertainty arising out of contextual strains in TG.

At this point of intersection, it is relevant to consider the following example motivated by Frege's "On Sense and Reference":

The reference of a sentence is not its truth value, for in that case it could always be replaced by another sentence of the same truth value; he would prove too much; one might just as well claim that the reference of 'morning star' is not Venus, since one may not always say 'Venus' in place of 'morning star'. (09)

And from the above quoted example if we try to modify the last sentence of TG taking the illusive word ("raining") in consideration then we have to study the following again with a modified version of the same text:

(5) Velan its "raining" in the hills.

(6) Velan its " ' in the hills (as we have in [4] above)

Raining is not a proper name here. Proper name has no substitution value just like scare quotes and the value proposed by Frege in the above quote. But contrary to what Frege said, is it not possible to substitute proper name through the use of other language? It is only the nickname which can supplement it. But there is no nickname in TG. Then if we replace Velan with some other name or even a



nickname, the sentence will lose its value within the context and plot of *TG*. Here the Proper Name Theory (PNT), "which gets a lot of bad press," seems to have a hold, within this context (Abrahams).

If we mark the above sentence hypothetically then this marking of scare quote in (1) can make it possible for the reader to replace the noun "raining" in (2) with a double scare quote on the one side and single on the other which can be comprehended as "raining" or anything suitable to the diagnostic value of the sentence thereby a forceful *certainty or uncertainty* of the change in meaning or what William Empson in his *Seven types of Ambiguity* called ambiguity.

If the scare quote is used in the way projected in (6) then it can be treated as a "Forceful Certainty" (words bearing fixed yet unfixed/ambiguous opinions) than a phantasmagoric sign of traditional scare quote (") accompanied by ('). This is then a signifier-couple half pointing in presence and half pointing towards the absence. If this is so then the text within it will follow ahead without meeting an aporic point of intersection, sublating the alphabets contained in it, *grasping* (as in WM) the real essence of the word.

That is why this half sign has to be placed after the full double quote like a mirror. A mirror which can capture the image and then turn to the other side for more reflections: Sign of double quote followed by its single, single quote as turned as a non substitute.

...quotation marks...help refer to a shape by pointing out something that has it...The singular term is the quotation marks, which may be read 'the expression a token of which is here'. (Davidson 90)

But here the double pointing marks (") imply certainly whereas the single pointing mark ('), which also function as a subordinate clause, uncertainly at the same time, warns the reader of the uncertainty of truth in any discourse, also forecasts reader's death. Frege opined: "The reference of the subordinate clause is accordingly a truth Value." (Nuccetelli 123).

Thus this statement gives a twist, an uncertain turn to the assumptions given in the above page, previously:

(7) Velan its " ' in the "hills."

(8) Velan its raining in the " '.

This placing of the "Forceful Certainty (" ') can affect the entire sentence and even the entire novel when read contextually. That is why any philosophical discourse showing this uncertainty should bear this sign (" '). **And that is why the present scholar proposes the use of this sign in**

grammar, especially the structure of sentences and discourse used in philosophy.

So it is important to note as to how scare quote moves the meaning of a sentence pragmatically, especially, when "Forceful Certainty" is used in it. Here, by coining the "Forceful Certainty" theory of scare quotes, motivated by the sign of breve in *différance*, the present scholar relied on the deconstructive approach of criticism.

That is why at this juncture it is pertinent to mention the basic functions of scare quote in deconstruction and the sign-value of *différance*---*diff-é-rance*. Deconstruction often uses the rhetorical device of scare quote. Sometimes these scare quotes act as a warning against interpreting deconstructive turns. Actually by the use of scare quotes Derrida : "warned against interpreting his reversals in a transcendental manner, his philosophy frequently verges on propounding transcendental and metaphysical arguments" (Reynolds 42). But when one talks of deconstructive concept of *différance* then even the half circle of breve, (which is half breve and half apostrophe) marking the whole indifference in *diff-é-rance*, is nothing but a singular scare quote.

This apostrophe is nothing but half breve. This half breve is nothing but a half-scare quote: half scare quote here and half nowhere or perhaps absent within the text somewhere. The spirit in 'différance' is neither naked nor fully covered by the scare quote(s). It lies somewhere between the word. It is like post modern fashion, spirit in existential lingerie.

GRASPING SCARE QUOTES IN WM

Scare quote is an optical metaphor par excellence for "deconstruction", contrary to the claims of Derrida that there is no metaphor for *deconstruction*, "deconstruction" or even 'deconstruction' (WM 26).

But how can one have the so called grasp on the proper essence of a periphrastic thought without having a firm grasp on one of many concepts and centralizing the eccentric plurality of scare quotes?

The first and the last paragraphs of WM do not have "philosophical," 'philosophical' or *philosophical* implications but they act as a "philosophical" scare quotes, placed ungrammatically, philosophically and absently in the beginning and the concluding part of the essay metaphorically.

These absent scare quotes/metaphors of absence used in WM and *TG* strike the sense of sight, by being the optical ones--- (a riddle, ungraspable, incomprehensible as the subtitle of WM): sun,



flower, stone, rain (a timeless natural phenomena etcetera). Of which the rose being the prime one in WM as: "the rose opens at dawn and closes at sunset; it lasts for a very short time" (Eco 251).


Every prominent metaphor for the metaphor in WM is optical then is it not contradictory of Derrida to quote: "Let us not dwell on the optical metaphor which opens up under the sun every theoretical point of view"? (WM 23). Thus in order to grasp scare quotes in WM it is pertinent to understand its value not as an optical metaphor but as a hidden yet effective device of absence.

UNCERTAIN NODES OF A METAPHORICAL SCARE QUOTE

What is metaphor if not an encyclopedic node tree? But can a scare quote, especially a philosophical scare quote, act within the domain of a node-tree? Perhaps it is the scare quote, especially a philosophical scare quote, which can actually act within a node-tree as it acts in mathematics (in axiomatic expressions). Scare quote not only act as a part of node tree but serve as a node itself. Take for the example quoted in "Quotation and Conceptions of Language" by Paul Saka:

- Roy Sorensen (2008, 57) asks us to "subtract our way to the empty string", the result being empty quotation:
- (9) 'lo' has two characters.
- (10) 'l' has one character.
- (11) " has no characters.
- (12) " has eight letters.

Saka challenged the grammatical existence of (11) above as proposed by Roy Sorensen (23). These quote signs can be represented progressively in a node tree as explained below:



The above node is optically present thus giving a feeling of grammatical and logical accuracy.

The logical structure displayed in these Porphyry's Trees do not set into action the structure of a dictionary tree. No last term goes back to the

first as we have in quoted sentences except for the self reflexive signs of quotes.

If possible, the spread of these Porphyry's Trees can only be controlled by scare quotes.

CERTAIN BEGINNINGS AND CERTAIN ENDS AS METAPHORICAL SCARE QUOTES IN WM

Philosophy ...and from philosophy, rhetoric. From a book-roughly and more or less a book-to create a flower, and to create it here, to bring it forth, to mount it, rather-to let it mount and find its dawning (and it turns aside as though of itself, revoluted, some grave flower). (WM 06)

Here it is a time to meditate into the question asked previously. Before discussing the relevance of the above opening paragraph of WM as a synecdoche and metaphorical scare quote as a synecdoche itself, it is important to know the expansion of this paragraph as node tree within the entire essay.

No one can avoid the tenor of rhetoric before plunging in and explaining visual, aural, tactile, olfactory or philosophical metaphors: The opening paragraph of WM starts with death, the death of flower: tactic and visual metaphor in rhetoric, through rhetoric.

The dried flower in WM died but not ever to see its birth again(06). On the other hand, the seed, the son to be "sown" (the nameless act of the sun), took over the charge, with the reflected rays of the Sun, and certain irreversible hope of responsibility of the rising, tomorrow, just like the rise of the sign of scare quote which is self reflexive(WM 56).

This beginning from a flower to a stone is compliment to the closing paragraph of WM with a stone where perhaps rising flower is kept metaphorically on the stone-grave of Philosophy. The beginning and the end part of WM stand like mirrors, just like philosophical scare quotes in absence within which the entire text survives. On this side, there is a flower and the other the stone which is cold and lifeless (like an image of a mirror).

This shrill, unrefined and primitive metaphor, of sun, of stone and of rose (in the opening paragraph as well as the closing one), emerged as a superego in WM. Rather suspended superego became political id in WM because of its obscurity.

Coming back to the end as the second turn to the beginning and the twin twist of scare quote, of WM, one can say that the state of death and its stone-like coldness is not at all colorless phenomena



as one unravels the final pages and its last paragraph, on which the present hypotheses rests:

The heliotrope, planted on the margin of the text, even before 'White Mythology' gets properly under way, is also, as is announced in the essay's very last words, a kind of oriental jasper, a stone, neither the black or anaemic white of mourning now, but 'a precious stone, greenish and streaked with red veins', the colours of wine, blood, life and (*j'espère*) hope. (Llewelyn 152).

Stone has been used frequently in WM as a metaphor. There are nodes involved in its presentation: Grindstone is another extension of this node-tree (WM 07, 09). Grindstone is grindstone and how can it be a metaphor? On the other hand, what is the grindstone if not just a metaphor of the metaphor of stone on the grounds of similarity and maintaining Aristotelian example of species to genus in his *Rhetoric*?

The grindstone was used by Polyphilos in the beginning of (WM 07). This grindstone also a metaphor for the whole twenty six alphabets used in the essay due to its frictional force, its black color (analogous to the ink used for writing). Thus grindstone, when speaking literally and philosophically, works like a pen and a rubber at the same time: It creates magnetic power by friction: gives and snatches natural powers from the other by charging and erasing them.

Anyhow, the grindstone which is alluded absently and metaphorically in the last paragraph of WM where a heliotrope becomes a green stone, effaced the traces of metaphor (which are there and which are not there, beyond grasp) as also it helped to carve out new figure(s)- the original and the most primitive (one being the green stone) (74). But the real grindstones, bringing in uncertainty by erasure, are the abs and ins of thought as they: "are more effective than any grindstone in planning down" (WM 09).

Magnet is completely marginalized in WM. However, it is "loadstone" which brings with it something which is similar and dissimilar on its opposite and similar poles (59).

However, lodestone is the most natural or primitive metaphor available to the mankind though nature. Stone as being and being of stone: For a stone, magnet is a metaphor and for the meaning inherent in a text/context, metaphor is a magnet and its attractiveness or the power to recall or attract is its being (without any economical significance of barter attached to it like the coin of Polyphilos) just like gravitation which is the being of earth:

It is above all to concern oneself with the nonsyntactic, nonsystematic pole, with semantic "depth," with the magnetizing effect of similarity rather than with positional combination, call it "metonymous." (WM 13)

If we talk of stones as philosophical scare quotes in WM then it is pertinent to mention this magnet which is a stone, if metaphorical, more of scientific than philosophical: " 'This expression 'iron is a sponge of , but also stone, magnetic fluid' is therefore a metaphor which diverges from the truth" (WM 61).

Then what of greatness of magnet and Great Magnet in WM? Magnet, although hard like any stone, produces invisible field which is not gravitational at all.

The title of the essay, WM, somehow strives to seek the whiteness, the originality of not any stone but whiteness of magnet, its invisibility, inside and outside its magnetic field (the one side of scare quote of the essay), as white as magnetic field. That is why "White Mythology" is also a Great Magnet for the Orient.

If the first paragraph and the death of flower is the rising sun of the First Stanziac scare quote (" trying to set in the beginning then the last line of WM is a helioscope (half risen and half set ['], repelled by its double, which gives no pain to the eyes, no fear of pain which is attached to looking at the sun or its metaphorical movement). That is why in the last lines of WM, Derrida explained heliotropes and helioscopes without citing its varied dimensions which are: they shut in the night and in cloudy weather, they are also a kind of Eastern Jasper used as a helioscope by which one can observe the eclipse of the sun (which is a star but hard like stone) (74).

Then finally the last lines are like helioscope through which one sees the eclipsed sun of WM and also the helioscope which protects blindness of the blind, the earth, but encourages the seer to view the sun and its light comfortable within its contextual orbit. Thus through this helioscope of scare quote one finally sees WM as a rock of secondary trap formation, a logo: "As for the stone called 'philosophal', the 'phal' alludes no doubt to the phallogocentrism of classical (glassical) metaphysics" (WM 152).

What happens to the grindstone after it has erased the coin? Polyphilos would have never "effaced" anything like magnet (WM 07). He never intended to carve out any uncertainty. That is why Polyphilos never tried to erase the grindstone. He could not do it because his currency never came on magnet or a stone (but the brain of his was also



magnetically turned, just like the turn of the flower, to erasing of exergue inscribed on the metal). From beginning to the end, from one signified of scare quote to the other (its half), one is caught between the hardness of flower, its death-turn, and its eclipse and the softness of stone and the other between the coin and its liquid layers solidifying later by the process of sedimentation.

But the question arises here is : what is in the certain base of the originality of the coin and the stone (Eastern Jasper) containing lithographic image-eclipse or ellipsis?

To understand this, at this point of reference one must go back to what has been said of stone previously (with a supplement): There is no doubt that flower is a sensory metaphor unlike Platonic sun but stone is also the most scientific and non sensory. The thread of thought that encapsulates WM, the fringe which forms the borderline of it, from "On the Obverse" to "Metaphysics: The 'Sublation' and Elevation of Metaphor" accommodates a program of vehicle and tenor, of the double quotation marks and its uncalled for/undue supplement, repelled by its own image: from the flower to the stone/lapidary/image of flower on stone which is sensuous and something close to scientific.

In between all these extensions of metaphorical nodes, WM emerged like an eclipsed, dead sun, naturally, which turns. These threads in the end and the beginning of WM supposedly look like extra and naturally uncertain philosophical metaphors on the margins: "This extra metaphor, remaining outside the field that it allows to be circumscribed, extracts or abstracts itself from this field, thus subtracting itself as a metaphor less" (WM 156).

It is not the sign on the coin that represents the coin (naturally) but it is the coin which represents the sign. This again is explained by the use of the metaphor of the flower, which turns with death: "At least, we discern two limits: first, Polyphilos, it seems, wants to preserve the capital intact, or rather, to preserve the natural wealth which precedes the accumulation of capital, the original virtue of the sensible image which is deflowered and spoilt by the history of the concept" (WM 08).

In the above quote, castration, ravishing and spoiling which somehow are close to the word 'deflowered' can be read in diverse ways. Flowering of emotions or senses can be understood throughout the world as the universal signified of senses like the language of exclamation. The language of exclamation, in its virgin state, then is perhaps the most metaphorical and sensible one. The language of

exclamation is also original/first flowering of the concept not corrupted by the nodes of any tree like onomatopoeic words of Saussure.

But how to determine the certainty of the absent quotation marks which are not optical, grammatically optical? When is the morning of these quotation marks?

The displacement of the oneric images of flower gives us insight into its essence of geographical roundness of these quotation marks. Is not this flower of rhetoric, this quotation mark (like) a sunflower--that is, though it is not an exact synonym, analogous to the heliotrope?

This conundrum, the tenors or extensions of nodes of these absent quotation marks/scare quotes within scare quote and its allied vehicles in WM can be analyzed with the following logical explanation:

colourless flower: colourless stone of the grave::stone which is green and veined with red :heliotrope (which may have color)

SCARE QUOTE IN THE GUIDE:

But before examining the above it is pertinent to mention the functioning of logical structure and grammatical function of the last sentence in *TG* :

(a) "Look (L^0) Velan it is raining (R^0) in (I^0) the (A^0) hills (H^0)" or "Look (L^V) Velan it is raining (R^V) in (I^P) the (A^d) hills (H^n)."

This can be analyzed only if we mark this utterance by Raju considering the *forceful, compulsive* and grammatical framework of structuralism. To proceed we must understand the example (a) first which bears the original, certain or literal meaning, unperturbed by the ironical or metaphorical extension. The sentence starting with (a) "Look (L^V) Velan it is raining (R^V) in (I^P) the (A^d) hills (H^n)" bears the grammatical truth proper to some literal meaning which must be complied with while reading the above lines where "look," "raining" and "hills" act as verbs: L^V , R^V and H^V , "in": a preposition of space I^P , and "the" (A^d): the definite article.

Whereas, in its original, literal sense (if there is one), "raining," when acting as gerund (R^B) gives a feeling of continuity like philosophical "being" (which is also a gerund). But gerund distorts the reality of some "be" in "being" in the same way as "raining" is being destroyed by its gerund formation, especially with the use of restless 'g.'

After this explanation, it is important to understand the restlessness of the alphabet 'g'. Scare quote has the value of *usure* (the wear) and usury (additional product of capital) in WM (07). Even 'being,' the word itself, bears the traces of Marxist



hierarchy. So if we try to make it more human and perhaps communal, then economizing its existence by crossing all the long and short alphabets involved in its formation. We can write it by reducing the alphabet b, standing confidentially with its bulging pot belly to the height of other alphabets and on the other hand also making short the alphabet g, cutting its dangling string, which hangs restlessly below the line with its restless leg syndrome: 'oeino.' This signifier 'oeino' which means wine in Greek, will then justify the word "Being" written democratically and will confine in the Marxist philosophy of equality amongst the alphabets. But it will be ungrammatical formation.

If it is sold in market with the help of advertisements, reselling it through research conferences, books, forceful incursion into syllabai and big banners perhaps then we can speak of democracy mingled with Marxism, Education and Consumerism. But not all justifications are serious. This is violence. Being illogical is violence. It is a violence which will invite mockery from the other. Violence on violence is not always non-violence. But Derrida was a non-veg as he justified it being an animal eater as declared one of his friends in Derrida Today conference in 2016. Ask a scholar of Hindi or Sanskrit (from where Derrida frequently uses words to justify his stand) will tell and let us know that there is no such scope for the conversion from noun to verb. It is a language which relies more on reality than thought treading words leading to funny nodes.

Dekho Velan pahadon par baarish (rain) ho rahi hai (the continuous form).

There no inflection for the word "बारिश" in Hindi which is similar to rains, rained or raining in English.

"Look Velan it is raining in the hills."

This destruction of "rain," which follows the principles of democracy in alphabets, thus becomes a political and misdirected singular metaphor (a directionless scare quote, half here and half nowhere), without a vehicle, used by a self prophesies swami, that is, that it is, Raju. It leads no one to nowhere. It only creates uncertainty in blind readers holding and filling an ever changing quotation mark while waiting for their culpable homicide. That is why we have few readers who read Philosophical texts everywhere. This text is itself given forcefully to students as if through injection.

There are other ways of reading this sentence, uncertainly, such as:

- (a) "Look (one can treat it as noun, "looking")
Velan (one can treat it as abstract noun for

the villagers, Velan and the readers) it is raining (one can treat it as a common noun) in (one can treat it as a conjunction) the (one can treat it as an adverb) hills (one can treat it as a verb)."

- (b) Look Velan it was raining (V+ past) in the hills. (This could be ironical and in the same time, ridiculous statement. Had Raju said this it would have been taken as an escape from the pain of forceful fasting).
(c) Look × (deletion of proper noun, *Velan*) it is raining in the hills.

In the second instance, (b), "Look (L^v) Velan it is raining (Rⁿ) in (I^p) the (A^d) hills (Hⁿ)," by replacing the grammatical quality of the noun "raining" we can understand that "raining (Rⁿ)" becomes something which is visible "being" or essence of rain.

The third instance, (c), becomes more complex as deletion of proper noun Velan would have incited many more complexities of meaning (one could have interpreted the deleted noun as an abstract noun for the "villagers" and the "readers" and proper noun of "Velan" and "Raju" or perhaps anything within the nodes of encyclopedic entry).

As said earlier, there can be innumerable interpretations of the above utterances. The above reading is nothing but certain misinterpretations of this uncertainty. This misinterpretation happened because of some certain absent scare quote in the above sentence. But when someone misinterprets a scare quote only then it becomes a scare quote. For example, if someone says: "Here comes the 'cow'" where the cow means a person who is innocent, shy so on and so forth. But if the interpreter takes the literal meaning of the word "cow" he/she will be misinterpreting the meaning by interpreting it.

In the same way, when someone like Coleridge, in his *Biographia Literaria*, said, philosophically: "in the infinite I AM" then instead of understanding I AM as a reference to Being and someone else may possibly interpret it as suggesting a combination of pronoun and verb, literally which will also be its misinterpretation perhaps(297).

In both the cases, reading the above words in a certain way "cow" and "I AM" will lead to uncertainty. But if one writes "cow" or even "raining" with a tinge of uncertainty then the meaning will be uncontrollable with its very sunrise and something outside language and: "A spread which cannot be controlled is not even a plurality of meaning: it belongs outside language" (WM 49). That is why the question of scare quote is the question of uncontrollability as also uncertainty.



What is uncertain must be kept outside the play. That is why the sign of scare quote has to be kept outside language, but within its logical, co-textual and contextual force. That is why one needs more *tools* (what the White wants is tools) to analyze the functioning of scare quote, in a given context and text in which it is contained.

Therefore, this highly structural pattern (“ ”) of scare quote, if uncertain, cannot survive for long in grammar. If it will survive or is surviving its because of its colonial nature (as now we have it in Hindi and Sanskrit too). Thus in a more refined logical structure, as reflected above, it is not possible to control a certain meaning. In the same way, in order to control the spread in *TG* and its last sentence one has to deal this under some logical attributes: river: stairs:: river: rain.

SCARE QUOTE AND METAPHORICAL SEMES IN WM

colourless flower: colourless stone of the grave::stone which is green and veined with red :heliotrope (which may have color)

In order to explain this and in the same way again the possibility of mapping death with stone is more apparent than that of flower in WM. Flower in WM becomes stone like hard, turns like a scare quote and dies. But one must not forget the basic circle in WM: Heliotrope (the flower) is also a stone.

What is the role of colorless flower in philosophy of WM as to heliotrope and the function of colorless stone on the grave and Eastern Jasper is a metaphorically conceptual question.

Colorlessness can then be attributed to whiteness, Orient and originality out of which "whiteness" seems to be of more rich in diagnostic value.

The below written sememes are nothing but a repetition of same structure in WM:

colorless flower:colorless stone of the grave::stone which is green and veined with red :heliotrope

(a) colorless flower (its recurrence as sememe):

Orient, heliotrope and gravity (Literal metaphors of senses over the scientific metaphors of analogy).

(b) color(less) stone on/of the grave (its recurrence as sememe):

Grindstone, sun, magnet and Eastern Jasper (Scientific metaphors of analogy over literal metaphors of senses).

In WM, it is not only difficult but also impossible to understand the contextual area as a tool for publishing so on and so forth. Derrida seems to map physical attributes, of all the nodes discussed

above, in the beginning and the end. These semes act as metaphor which remain outside the text like any scare quote (when speaking philosophically with double and single scare quote, (“ ’)).

UNDERSTANDING SCARE QUOTE AS METAPHOR IN TG AND WM COLLECTIVELY

As compared to WM, it is easy to mark the contextual area of *TG*. However, in *TG* the reader may become more interested in apparently absent attribute of 'raining' and 'going up/down the stairs' by Raju.

When one reads the relationship between “water” and “rain” (and also their signified value as we have discussed of sign quotes) in *TG* one sees that there is a blink certainty of inferiority or superiority of one word over the other. Rain and water is of the same species: one belongs horizontally to this world whereas the other belongs to the other world, vertically, invisibly, that is that it is sky.

The water, in which Raju dropped his feet, in the last, was the same stable water in which he washed his face in the beginning (*TG* 01, 217) . This is a step from genus to genus without contextual strains. Whereas, the rain, in the end, became a next step forward from genus to species (from “rain” to “water”).

In *TG*, the meaning will always follow text and context protected in brackets. But “raining” if understood as an uncertain ‘concept’ which is beyond uncertainty is “unreachable,’ “unpredictable,’ meta language (thus within “ ’).

There is problem in grasping “raining” again as it is impossible to know and prove whether there is a certain metaphor or not in “raining” of *TG*. If there is one then how to identify that metaphor ? If we see this problem within the domains of the characters in *TG* without bringing outside knowledge, like the New Critics, then it will always depend on the one who said and the one who heard.

Both the characters (Raju and Velan) are images. They cannot speak more than they have already spoken in the novel. So, we can say reading through this text:

(a) It is the quotation mark (“ ’ / ’ ’) which is the real being of a text, and handy too, which moves, without any happening of time but within the space of the written text.

(b) Therefore, this highly structural pattern (“ ”) of scare quote, if uncertain, cannot survive for long in grammar. If it will survive or is surviving it’s because of its colonial nature (as now we have it in Hindi and Sanskrit too).



- (c) Deletion of quotes from any text is "the" deletion of historical-being from any text. Thus deletion of power structure, projected through/in history itself.
- (d) It is the quotation mark (" " / ' ') which is the real being of a text, and handy too, which moves, without any happening of time but within the space of the written text.
- (e) "Raining" in *TG* is context independent sentence hence abstract and uncertain. But there is a certain meaning which is absent and gives rise to a broken link which should be represented by an uncertain sign of scare quote (').
- (f) In fiction a character says something and means nothing at all. Speaker in the fictional text cannot speak beyond what he/she has already always spoken. It is not the character which makes the metaphor of scare quote but the reader who creates it.
- (g) It is not the reader but the author who creates the pragmatic scare quote with a double sign and a singular sign (" '). This marks the death of the reader.
- (h) Scare quotes should not always be taken literally, as have been taken by linguists. They have their philosophical value as well. A quote mark can be used without its sign-value (" ") in a text. Such mark or the metaphor for this mark should be understood by placing this "Forceful Certain' (" ') as a sign in English Grammar excluding other languages please.
- (i) Finally, my apologies.

CONCLUSION

The present writer believes that the sign of scare quote and double quote which has been read and used more seriously within a text in order to understand its certain and uncertain function should be reviewed in contemporary English grammar.

The first and the last paragraphs of *WM* and *TG* act as some certain absent scare quote. That is why the present writer proposes the sign of "Forceful Certain' (" ') in English grammar where the scare quote when used in a philosophical in text or in a fictional work having certainly uncertain feature should be represented with its double and its singular mirror image (" '). Here by coining the "Forceful Certain' (" ') theory of scare quotes, motivated by the sign of breve in différance, the present scholar relied on the deconstructive approach of criticism.

If this sign of "Forceful Certain' (" ') is used then this heliotrope like scare quote, will rise up without rising (which can only be captured in

painting, a fictional work so on and so forth). Being away from the field and without entering another field of the death, it will neither be in the air nor in the earth, neither in the day nor in the night (it will harp in the region of twilight of thought); it will always already be uprooted from the written language and its gravity/magnetism of certainness, repelled and attracted by the space. It will survive and fight this up root without rain or draught without its seed or stamen rooted and de-rooted in the same time.

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